Lo viejo funciona

Tecnología, instituciones y guerra en tiempos de disrupción tecnológica

Authors

  • Aureliano da Ponte UCM-UNDEF
  • Leandro Ocón

Keywords:

estrategia, guerras, conflictos armados, revolución tecnológica, territorios

Abstract

This article explores the coexistence of emerging and dual-use technologies with the persistence of structural elements of contemporary warfare, particularly industrial capacity, strategic logistics, and defence institutions. An analytical framework is proposed that operationalizes the integration of dual technologies, technological sovereignty (TS), and defence industrial base under conditions of weaponized interdependence. The proposed framework provides a conceptual articulation that the extant literature has not yet developed in a systematic way. The present study utilizes a comparative analysis of the Russia-Ukraine (2022–2024) and Israel-Iran (2025) conflicts to demonstrate the efficacy of institutional absorption, industrial scaling, and logistical resilience in converting innovations into sustainable strategic effects. This analysis is supported by verifiable TS indicators and open evidence, which provide a robust foundation for the study's findings. The findings suggest that technological disruption does not substitute for the material foundations of military strength; rather, it re-evaluates their significance, thereby reinforcing the centrality of industry, institutions, and logistics in operational effectiveness.

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Published

2026-04-30

How to Cite

da Ponte, A., & Ocón, L. (2026). Lo viejo funciona: Tecnología, instituciones y guerra en tiempos de disrupción tecnológica . Estudios Sobre El Poder. Revista De Ciencia Política, 2(3). Retrieved from https://ojs.unsj.edu.ar/index.php/epoder/article/view/1513