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Tecnología, instituciones y guerra en tiempos de disrupción tecnológica
Palabras clave:
estrategia, guerras, conflictos armados, revolución tecnológica, territoriosResumen
Este artículo examina la relación entre la innovación tecnológica y los fundamentos del poder militar en la guerra contemporánea. Sostiene que las tecnologías emergentes y de doble uso no se traducen automáticamente en ventajas estratégicas, sino que dependen de capacidades institucionales, industriales y logísticas preexistentes. El estudio desarrolla un marco analítico que vincula innovación, Soberanía Tecnológica (ST) y base industrial, conceptualizándolas como condiciones habilitantes y limitantes de la capacidad estratégica. Se propone un estudio comparado de dos conflictos recientes: Rusia–Ucrania (2022–2024) e Israel–Irán (2025). A partir del análisis de la adopción tecnológica, la absorción institucional y el sostenimiento industrial logístico, los resultados muestran que la innovación sólo produce efectos operacionales sostenibles cuando se inserta en sistemas de producción resilientes, estructuras organizacionales y cadenas de suministro capaces de escalar y reponer capacidades bajo condiciones de interdependencia armada. Los hallazgos indican que la disrupción tecnológica no sustituye las bases materiales e institucionales de la guerra; por el contrario, las revaloriza al demostrar que la eficacia estratégica depende de estructuras duraderas de producción, logística y gobernanza.
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