Two Conditions For Any Formulation Of A Definition Of Art: On The Falsifiable And Relational Character Of The Work Of Art

Abstract

The article examines the contribution of philosophy to the definition of art, proposing two conditions that any definition of art must meet. First, a “falsificationist” condition: every artistic theory should be provisional, accepting that future works may refute it, as avant-garde movements did with earlier models. This implies that art actively participates in questioning its own definitions, rejecting static stances like that of Danto, who, from a Hegelian framework, delegated its definition to philosophy, thereby limiting art’s transformative role. Second, the “relational” condition: a sort of subject-event relationship is necessary for anything to count as art, where the artistic emerges from the subject’s perceptual and cognitive transformation in response to the artwork. This relationship depends on a subject’s disposition shaped by historical and cultural training, not on the event’s intrinsic qualities. Finally, the text emphasizes the need to investigate this dynamic from different philosophical approaches, and reassessing classical notions like the beautiful and the sublime as expressions of aesthetic experience.