G. HARMAN'S SKEPTICAL CHALLENGE: SOME CONSEQUENCES

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Agustina Laura Maini

Abstract

In this work I intend to draw certain consequences del skeptic challenge powered by Graham Harman (1986/2002) around the normativity of logic. To do this, I will reconstruct the skeptical challenge and analyze a proposal to overcome it developed by John MacFarlane (2004). I will examine one of the problems present in the literature known as the "paradox of the preface" which will serve as an analytical tool. I will conclude that Harman's skeptical challenge sets a limit to the normative force of logic on reasoning.

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How to Cite
Maini, A. L. (2020). G. HARMAN’S SKEPTICAL CHALLENGE: SOME CONSEQUENCES. TRAZOS – Revista De Estudiantes De Filosofía, 1(4), 18-29. Retrieved from https://ojs.unsj.edu.ar/index.php/trazos/article/view/730
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Artículos de investigación

References

Harman, G. (2002): “Internal Critique: a Logic is not a Theory of Reasoning and a Theory of Reasoning is not a Logic”. En Gabbay et al. (Eds.), “Handbook of the Logic of Argument and Inference” (171-186). North Holland: Elsevier.
MacFarlane, J. (2004): “In What Sense (If Any) Is Logic Normative for Thought?” Recuperado de: http://johnmacfarlane.net/work.html (Acceso: 19 de septiembre de 2015).
Steinberger, F. (2017): "The Normative Status of Logic", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2017 Edition). Edward N. Zalta (ed.). Recuperado de: https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/logic-normative/.