IS MATHEMATICS REALLY AN A PRIORI SYNTHETIC JUDGMENT? A REVISION FROM THE KANTIAN PROPOSAL

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Mauricio Vargas Abarca

Abstract

In the Critique of pure reason, Kant establishes a dualism of knowledge in the human being: there is a knowledge that is pure, opposed to empirical knowledge. He says that all knowledge begins with experience, but not everything comes from it (Kant, 1997, B1); so that there are external objects that awaken in us the faculty of knowing, therefore no knowledge is prior, temporarily, to the experience. Thus, the task that cannot be easily dispatched is to know if there is then, even with it, a knowledge that does not come from experience or from the impressions of the senses, that is, that is a priori.

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How to Cite
Vargas Abarca, M. (2017). IS MATHEMATICS REALLY AN A PRIORI SYNTHETIC JUDGMENT? A REVISION FROM THE KANTIAN PROPOSAL. TRAZOS – Revista De Estudiantes De Filosofía, 2(1), 128-133. Retrieved from https://ojs.unsj.edu.ar/index.php/trazos/article/view/795
Section
Ensayos filosóficos

References

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